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ESSAY
PROVERBIAL PRACTICE: LEGAL ETHICS FROM OLD
TESTAMENT WISDOM*
Gordon J. Beggs**
The Old Testament book of Proverbs supplied foundational moral val-
ues for our nation's legal ethics. With the adoption and revision of
formal codes, moral teaching has virtually disappeared from legal eth-
ics. This essay suggests that the wisdom of Proverbs offers a timely
challenge to the character of the legal profession by advocating values
which include justice, purity, mercy, humility, honesty, candor, truth-
ful testimony, and civility.
The proverbs of Solomon son of David, King of Israel:
for attaining wisdom and discipline;
for understanding words of insight;
for acquiring a disciplined and prudent life,
doing what is right and just and fair;
for giving prudence to the simple,
knowledge and discretion to the young-
let the wise listen and add to their learning,
and let the discerning get guidance-
for understanding proverbs and parables,
the sayings and riddles of the wise.
The fear of the LORD iS the beginning of knowledge,
but fools despise wisdom and discipline.
Prologue, Proverbs 1:1-7 (NIV).'
INTRODUCTION
When legal educator David Hoffman of the University of Maryland
published the United States' first course on legal ethics almost 160 years
ago, he included a reading list that began with Proverbs of Solomon, a
book from the Old Testament of the Bible.2 His selection of Proverbs re-
* 01995 by Gordon J. Beggs.
** Staff Attorney, Fair Employment Practices Clinic, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973, University of Pennsylvania. I wish to thank Professor Veronica
Dougherty for her helpful comments.
1. The Scriptures in this essay are, except as otherwise noted, taken from the HOLY
BmLE, NEw INTERNATIONAL VERSION, Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984 International Bible Soci-
ety and are used by permission of Zondervan Bible Publishers.
2. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE PRO-
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flected the primary role of the Judeo-Christian ethic as the source of
morals for the nation at that time." His choice was also faithful to the
historic use of the book, indicated in its prologue, of preparing the young
to administer the Hebrew government in a wise and Godly manner.4
George Sharswood succeeded Hoffman as the nation's leading au-
thority on legal ethics.5 Sharswood served as Dean of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and later as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.6 His lectures on legal ethics beginning in 1854 laid the
foundation for our modern codes.7 Sharswood expressed the Judeo-Chris-
tian view that law is derived from principles laid down by a Supreme
Being and recommended "the most careful study" of the "system of law
delivered by Moses to the Jews."8 Sharswood shared Hoffman's view that
Proverbs was a source of ethical principles for lawyers. He cited the book
to support what today seems the counterintuitive principle of moderation
in the accumulation of wealth9 and to condemn deception in practice.10
Both Hoffman and Sharswood emphasized that the attorney's con-
duct should be governed by conscience. In his writings, Hoffman refused
to separate private from public morality, and indicated that lawyers
should not be exempt from the ethical norms that guide all citizens.1"
Sharswood held the same beliefs, noting that "[n]o man can ever be a
truly great lawyer, who is not in every sense of the word, a good man
.... A lawyer without the most sterling integrity may shine for a while
with meteoric splendor; but his light will soon go out in the blackness of
darkness.
'1 2
With the adoption and revision of formal codes of ethics, the empha-
FESSION GENERALLY 724 (Arno Press 1972). Hoffman's list also featured the Old Testament
book Ecclesiastes and, from the Apocrypha, the books of Ecclesiasticus, and Wisdom. Id.
3. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (noting that "[w]e are a reli-
gious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213, 318 (1827) (stating that "[m]oral obligations are those arising from the
admonitions of conscience and accountability to the Supreme Being"). See also Arlin M.
Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559,
1616 (1989) (stating that "[t]he Founders undoubtedly would have concurred with Justice
Douglas' observation in Zorach.").
4. ANDREW E. HEL & JOHN H. WALTON, A SURVEY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 287 (1991).
5. THOMAs L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS 76 (1985) [hereinafter SHAFFER,
ETHics].
6. Memorial to GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHics iii, viii (5th ed., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1993) (1896).
7. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 5; THoMAs L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A
LAWYER 7 (1981) [hereinafter SHAFFER, CHsTN LAWYER].
8. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 10-12.
9. Id. at 18 (citing Proverbs 13:11).
10. Id. at 74 (citing Proverbs 26:27).
11. Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Cul-
ture, 38 MD. L. REv. 673, 684 (1979). Hoffman's approach is exemplified in his Resolution
XII: "I will never plead the Statute of Limitations, when based on the mere efflux of time:
for if my client is conscious he owes the debt and has no other defence than the legal bar, he
shall never make me a partner in his knavery." HOFFmAnN, supra note 2, at 754.
12. SHARsWOOD, supra note 6, at 168.
[Vol. 30
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sis that Hoffman and Sharswood placed on moral principles has, over
time, given way to an effort to regulate professional conduct by increas-
ingly detailed prescriptive norms. The American Bar Association (ABA)
Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, contained thirty-two
principles.' 3 Seven of these made explicit reference to broad ethical con-
cepts such as "conscience," "honor," and "moral law.""' By contrast, the
1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct makes two brief refer-
ences to "personal conscience," which appear in the Preamble. 5 The
forty-nine model rules, which include numerous subdivisions, contain
only one express reference to morals, which is permissive: "In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social, and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client's situation."' 6
Professor Thomas Shaffer has commented on this trend in legal
ethics:
Each generation of American lawyers ... has revised its code of ethics;
each revision says less about morals and says what it does say about
morals less clearly. The American Bar Association's new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for American lawyers bring this development to
new fullness by avoiding the traditional words of ethical argument,
words such as conscience, morality, right, good, and propriety, in favor
of the words of mandate and permission that are the stuff of statutes
and court orders. The claim implicit in these proposals is that the na-
tionally organized bar is not interested in providing, or is not able to
provide, moral admonition to American lawyers; moral admonition has
become either entirely private, or non-professional, or it has become a
concern appropriate in more local or more specialized organizations of
lawyers.'
Instead, the bar now looks primarily to the adversary system, rather than
broad moral principles, as the source of what is right.'" This change has
occurred notwithstanding the fact that contemporary practice centers on
the office and board room rather than the courts. 19 Today, few lawyers or
13. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
14. Id. Canons 15, 16, 22, 25, 30, 31, and 32.
15. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Preamble (1990) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
16. Id. Rule 2.1.
17. SHAFFER, ETmics, supra note 5, at 167; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Eth-
ics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REv. 963, 963 (1987) ("Most of what is called legal
ethics is similar to rules made by administrative agencies. It is regulatory. Its appeal is not
to conscience, but to sanction. It seeks mandate rather than insight.").
18. SHAFFER, CHRISTIAN LAWYER, supra note 7, at 77 (suggesting that "American legal
ethics narrowed itself to the English-barrister model").
19. See ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrry
395, 399-400 (1991) (few ethical standards address pervasive attorney roles as advisors and
negotiators); see also F.B. MacKinnon, Summary of a Statement of the Effect of Religious
Principles on Lawyers' Ethical Problems, 10 VAND. L. REv. 931, 935-36 (1957) (noting the
prevalence of proceedings such as arbitration, collective bargaining, contract negotiation,
and informal agency proceedings which differ significantly from a formal adversary proceed-
19951
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courts refer to religious principles to discern applicable standards of con-
duct.20 As a general rule, law professors do not consider it their responsi-
bility to teach morality to their students.21
In some measure, the history of legal ethics since Hoffman and Shar-
swood simply reflects the movement of jurisprudence away from natural
law theory, which recognized universal moral principles and afforded the
nineteenth century lawyer a foundation for ethics.2 2 By the beginning of
the twentieth century, natural law had been largely supplanted by the
positivism advanced by the analytic school, which argued that no moral
foundation was required for laws, as it consisted merely of a "system of
precepts imposed or enforced by the sovereign." 23 Roscoe Pound put it
metaphorically: "The state t[ook] the place of Jehovah handing the tables
of the law to Moses.12 4 More recently, scholars belonging to the critical
legal studies movement would deny laws, including ethical codes, "any
special character separating them from politics and political decisions." 2
Similarly, the adherents of the law and economics school would attempt
to evaluate the codes according to their potential to maximize wealth.20
Nonetheless, some commentators have expressed disdain for the re-
cent trend in legal ethics away from a focus on morality. According to
Professor Michael Swygert, these newer approaches have eroded "the
nexus between law and morality"2 7 by their emphasis on "wealth max-
imization and political manipulations." 8 Professor Owen Fiss believes
that this separation of law from morality is a product of a time in which
people focused on their differences, rather than on any shared values or
ideals.29 Against this background, states Fiss:
ing and indicating that "[b]ecause of these differences, the demands on the lawyer's self
restraint in the interest of justice may be great.").
20. MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 933 ("For most lawyers religious principles appar-
ently do not offer directly applicable standards of conduct, either in terms of solutions for
particular problems such as that of divorce or in terms of absolutely constant rules of be-
havior such as honesty."); J. Michael Medina, The Bible Annotated: Use of the Bible in
Reported American Decisions, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 187, 252 (1991) (stating that courts cite
the Bible for pithy quotes, history, and wisdom); Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of Reli-
gious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433, 442 (1993) (indicating that "reli-
gion and religious values (at least as traditionally defined) are generally viewed as
illegitimate sources from which to draw in the judicial decision-making process.").
21. See, e.g. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31,
31 (1992) ("The conventional view on most faculties has been that education in professional
responsibility is someone else's responsibility.").
22. RoscoE PoUND, LAW AND MORALS 1-2 (1969) (noting that natural law theory views
positive law as the declaration of universal moral principles).
23. Id. at 13.
24. Id. at 14.
25. J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 432 (1992).
26. See id. at 436-38.
27. Michael I. Swygert, Striving to Make Great Lawyers - Citizenship and Moral Re-
sponsibility: A Jurisprudence for Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REV. 803, 817 (1989).
28. Id.
29. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1986).
[Vol. 30
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The prospect of understanding and nourishing a common morality
seemed hopeless.. . .We will never be able to respond fully to the neg-
ativism of critical legal studies or the crude instrumentalism of law and
economics until a regenerative process takes hold, until the broad social
processes that fed and nourished those movements are reversed.30
This essay is offered as a step toward the regeneration of shared pub-
lie values which Professor Fiss invites.31 The author attempts to explore
some of the underlying principles of legal ethics as Hoffman and Shar-
swood might have understood that term. While this effort might be un-
dertaken from other Judeo-Christian sources, the present essay is based
on Proverbs, as Hoffman and Sharswood both relied on the book as a
source for their teaching. The reader is invited to consider whether the
Judeo-Christian principles expressed in Proverbs provide guidance for the
modern practice of law.
I. PROVERBS AND ITS THEOLOGY
Proverbs was composed by several authors, including King Solomon,
between the tenth and sixth centuries B.C.32 The word "proverb" in He-
brew has a variety of meanings and may refer to a "comparison, a code of
behavior, and the discovery of hidden truth. '33 The book consists of a
series of poetic forms, including contrasts, similes, and metaphors. 3' As
stated by the Prologue, these writings are intended to teach wisdom, dis-
cipline, and discretion. 5
Proverbs cannot be completely understood apart from its theology.'
The Prologue instructs that "[t]he fear of the LORD is the beginning of
knowledge. '37 As commentators have noted, this concept is one of
relationship:
Essentially, then, the fear of the Lord is a worshiping, reverent submis-
sion to the God of the covenant. The fear of the Lord is a right rela-
tionship to God, one of obedience to his covenant stipulations that
prompts right method in thought and right behavior in action.'8
Thus, Proverbs, while practical in its application, is grounded in faith.
The text encourages the reader: "Trust in the LORD with all your heart
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. HmL & WALTON, supra note 4, at 286-87.
33. Id. at 286.
34. THE NIV STUDY BBLE 943 (Kenneth Barker et al. eds., 1985). Proverbs personifies
wisdom and folly as women, each of whom attempts to persuade the young to follow her
way. See id. at 944.
35. Id. at 943; Proverbs 1:4.
36. See Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-text: The Turn to the Jewish
Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARv. L. REV. 813, 821 (1993)
(stating that "[o]ne cannot fully understand Jewish law without considering the religious
framework that makes Jewish law possible and renders it intelligible to its practitioners").
37. Proverbs 1:7.
38. HmL & WALTON, supra note 4, at 288.
1995]
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and lean not on your own understanding; in all your ways acknowledge
him, and he will make your paths straight." 9 Underscoring this idea, the
book makes numerous references to the omniscience40 and justice41 of
God.
According to Proverbs, righteous adherence to the book's teachings
will result in numerous blessings. For example, one will be rewarded with
a sense of joy: "The prospect of the righteous is joy, but the hopes of the
wicked come to nothing. '42 There is also a peace that attends an unbur-
dened conscience: "The man of integrity walks securely, but he who takes
crooked paths will be found out. '43 The righteous earn a good name, an
asset of inestimable value for an individual: "A good name is more desira-
ble than great riches . . . . 44 Because there is an interconnectedness to
the enterprises of mankind, this honor extends even to the community in
which the righteous reside: "Through the blessing of the upright a city is
exalted, but by the mouth of the wicked it is destroyed."'45
It should be noted that these blessings do not purport to be prophecy
in the sense of the certain promise of God.4s Instead, Proverbs may be
read as wisdom literature to catalog benefits that may reasonably be ex-
pected to flow from Proverbial practice, consisting of right attitudes and
behavior consistent with Old Testament wisdom.
47
39. Proverbs 3:5-6.
40. See, e.g., Proverbs 5:21 ("For a man's ways are in full view of the LORD, and he
examines all his paths."); Proverbs 16:2 ("All a man's ways seem innocent to him, but mo-
tives are weighed by the LORD."); Proverbs 21:2 ("All a man's ways seem right to him, but
the LORD weighs the heart.").
41. See, e.g., Proverbs 3:11-12 ("My son, do not despise the LORD's discipline and do
not resent his rebuke, because the LORD disciplines those he loves, as a father the son he
delights in."); Proverbs 11:4 ("Wealth is worthless in the day of wrath, but righteousness
delivers from death."); Proverbs 12:2 ("A good man obtains favor from the LORD, but the
LORD condemns a crafty man."); Proverbs 16:4 ("The LORD works out everything for his own
ends-even the wicked for a day of disaster."); Proverbs 28:9 ("If anyone turns a deaf ear to
the law, even his prayers are detestable."); Proverbs 29:26 ("Many seek an audience with a
ruler, but it is from the LORD that man gets justice.").
42. Proverbs 10:28.
43. Proverbs 10:9.
44. Proverbs 22:1. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania commented that this verse was
given "vivid meaning" when it relied on the testimony of 52 character witnesses and 21
letters to acquit a trial judge charged with violations of the canons of judicial ethics as a
result of accepting an envelope containing cash from a union official. In re Sylvester, 555
A.2d 1202, 1208 (Pa. 1989).
45. Proverbs 11:11.
46. For the Biblical standard for prophecy, see Deuteronomy 18:22 ("If what a
prophet proclaims in the name of the LORD does not take place or come true, that is a
message the LORD has not spoken. That prophet has spoken presumptuously. Do not be
afraid of him.").
47. Tim NIV STUDY BmLE, supra note 34, at 943. The editors of The NIV Study Bible
caution that "we must not interpret [Proverbs] as prophecy or its statements about certain
effects and results as promises .... [T]here are enough exceptions to indicate that some-
times the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper." Id.
HeinOnline  -- 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 836 1995
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JI. PROVERBIAL PRACTICE
A. Justice
Proverbs suggests a very different motivation for the practice of law
than the desire for wealth, power, and glamour-qualities glorified in the
television series L.A. Law-which is believed to have attracted many re-
cent law school applicants. 8 As noted by George Sharswood, Proverbs ad-
vises restraint in the quest for wealth.49 The appropriate goal is modest
indeed: "[G]ive me neither poverty nor riches, but give me only my daily
bread."50 According to the Scripture, seeking anything more may lead to
unfortunate consequences: "A faithful man will be richly blessed, but one
eager to get rich will not go unpunished."
'5 1
Likewise, power and glamour should not be paramount concerns.
Proverbs counsels that it is "[b]etter to be lowly in spirit and among the
oppressed than to share plunder with the proud. '5 2 Instead, the lawyer's
purpose should be serving the cause of justice, or as stated by the Pro-
logue, "acquiring a disciplined and prudent life, doing what is right and
just and fair. '5 3 Understanding this is one of the blessings that accompa-
nies the wisdom of Proverbs."
B. Purity
The attorney who is concerned with "doing what is right and just and
fair" will be selective in accepting cases. The ethical lawyer chooses not to
pursue the frivolous claims of an overly-litigious client. Modern practice,
by contrast, attempts to divorce the morality of the lawyer from that of
the client.55 David Hoffman did not accept this distinction. He resolved:
"If, after duly examining a case, I am persuaded that my client's claim or
48. Jean Webb, director of admissions at Yale University School of Law, which was
seeing more than a twelve percent drop in applications in 1995 thinks "'L.A. Law' may be a
factor. Before its cancellation, the show made law look 'like a glamorous profession.'" Jeff
Barge, Fewer Consider Law, A.BA J., June 1995, at 24, 24. In 1994, Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow stated, "I really do think 'L.A. Law' has had an effect. There is no question
students are still driven by the almighty dollar." James Podgers, Chasing the Ideal, A.BA
J., Aug. 1994, at 56, 58. Professor Stephen Gillers commented that "[p]eople come to law
school subliminally influenced by 'L.A. Law."' David S. Machlowitz, Lawyers on TV, A.BA
J., Nov. 1988, at 52, 55. The article elaborated that "[t]he effect may be more than sublimi-
nal. Some attribute the 10 percent rise in law school applications [in 1988] to 'L.A. Law' as
well as to the Oct. 19 market crash, which made MBAs less desirable." Id.
49. SHARSwooD, supra note 6, at 18 (quoting Proverbs 13:11, which states that
"[d]ishonest money dwindles away, but he who gathers money little by little makes it
grow").
50. Proverbs 30:8.
51. Proverbs 28:20.
52. Proverbs 16:19.
53. Proverbs 1:3.
54. Proverbs 2:9-10 ("Then you will understand what is right and just and fair-every
good path. For wisdom will enter your heart, and knowledge will be pleasant to your soul.").
55. The current ABA code states: "A lawyer's representation of a client, including rep-
1995]
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defence (as the case may be), cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained,
I will promptly advise him to abandon it."5 Similarly, George Sharswood
taught:
Counsel have an undoubted right, and are in duty bound, to refuse to
be concerned for a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a demand which of-
fends his sense of what is just and right. The courts are open to the
party in person to prosecute his own claim, and plead his own cause;
and although he ought to examine and be well satisfied before he ref-
uses to a suitor the benefit of his professional skill and learning, yet it
would be on his part an immoral act to afford that assistance, when his
conscience told him that the client was aiming to perpetrate a wrong
through the means of some advantage the law may have afforded him. 
7
Hoffman and Sharswood's views find support in Proverbs' admoni-
tion not to "accuse a man for no reason-when he has done you no
harm."58 The Scripture recommends: "What you have seen with your eyes
do not bring hastily to court, for what will you do in the end if your
neighbor puts you to shame?159 The text also warns: "If a wise man goes
to court with a fool, the fool rages and scoffs, and there is no peace."8' 0
Proverbial practice will therefore avoid unjust litigation which is "detest-
able" to the Lord and serves only to create dissension.
6 1
According to George Sharswood, selective practice also includes dis-
suading an eager client with a meritorious claim whose prosecution is not
in the client's overall best interest.62 Sharswood notes that "[a] very im-
portant part of the advocate's duty is to moderate the passions of the
party, and where the case is of a character to justify it, to encourage an
amicable compromise of the controversy."8 This approach comports with
Proverbs' wisdom that many matters are better left unpursued: "Starting
a quarrel is like breaching a dam; so drop the matter before a dispute
breaks out."" Indeed, for some disputes even a resolution by chance may
be preferable to a contest which serves the interest of counsel more than
the client: "Casting the lot settles disputes and keeps strong opponents
apart.
65
resentation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activities." MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.2(b).
56. HoFFMAN, supra note 2, at 754.
57. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 96.
58. Proverbs 3:30.
59. Proverbs 25:7-8.
60. Proverbs 29:9.
61. Proverbs 6:16 & 19 (stating that "a man who stirs up dissension among brothers is
detestable to the Lord").
62. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 109.
63. Id.
64. Proverbs 17:14.
65. Proverbs 18:18.
[Vol. 30
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C. Mercy
Proverbs expresses special concern regarding justice for the poor. As
such, Proverbial practice involves both a prescriptive and a proscriptive
duty with respect to the poor. The first, a responsibility to assist those
unable to afford legal services, has been recognized throughout our his-
tory. David Hoffman asserted that an attorney should diligently represent
the poor, notwithstanding the fact that their claims might be small.66
Modern practice involves a duty to "render public interest legal service"
which may be discharged "by providing professional services at no fee or
a reduced fee to persons of limited means. '6 7 The Supreme Court re-
cently stated: "[I]n a time when the need for legal services among the
poor is growing and public funding for such services has not kept pace,
lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer their time and skills pro bono
publico is manifest."68
The duty to assist the poor is central to Proverbs: "The righteous
care about justice for the poor, but the wicked have no such concern." 69
The book contains an explicit instruction to represent the poor:
Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of
all who are destitute.
Speak up and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy.
70
Otherwise, there may be consequences: "If a man shuts his ears to the cry
of the poor, he too will cry out and not be answered." 71
As this last verse suggests, Proverbs also establishes a proscription
with no precise counterpart in modern practice.72 This is a duty, based on
the relationship of God to man, not to oppress the poor using the law:
"He who oppresses the poor shows contempt for their Maker, but who-
66. HOFFmAN, supra note 2, at 760.
67. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 15, Rule 6.1.
68. Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). Nevertheless, the
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that Mallard, who was challenging his appointment to a pris-
oners' rights case, was correct in his assertion that a district court had no authority to re-
quire an attorney to render services over the attorney's objection. Id. at 301-02. The Court
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) only authorizes a court to "request" such services.
Mallard, 490 U.S. at 301-02.
69. Proverbs 29:7.
70. Proverbs 31:8-9.
71. Proverbs 21:13.
72. Modern practice prohibits oppression, but only where the actions serve no legiti-
mate purpose. The current ABA code provides that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law." MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3.1. This reflects a slight modifi-
cation of the prior standard contained in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
which stated that an attorney could not "[ffile a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense,
delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious
that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsrBiLrrY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1969).
1995]
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ever is kind to the needy honors God."73 The text counsels the practi-
tioner: "Do not exploit the poor because they are poor and do not crush
the needy in court, for the LORD will take up their case and will plunder
those who plunder them."7 The courts, like the practitioner, must also
ensure that this duty of fairness to the poor is upheld: "If a king judges
the poor with fairness, his throne will always be secure."75
D. Humility
Though humility is not a characteristic that the public generally as-
sociates with lawyers, David Hoffman identified it as essential. He offered
his reasoning in a colorful metaphor:
Law is a deep science: its boundaries, like space, seem to recede, as
we advance: and though there be as much of certainty in it, as in any
other science, it is fit we should be modest in our opinions, and ever
willing to be further instructed. Its acquisition is more than the labour
of a life; and, after all, can be with none the subject of unshaken confi-
dence. In the language then, of a late beautiful writer, I am resolved to
"consider my own acquired knowledge but as a torch flung into an
abyss, making the darkness visible, and showing me the extent of my
own ignorance.
'76
As Hoffman suggests, humility is essential to keeping the lawyer sharp
and effective in a complex and rapidly-changing profession. In Proverbial
practice, humility is necessary for success, and its absence portends disas-
ter: "Do you see a man wise in his own eyes? There is more hope for a
fool than for him.'1 7 Advising the discerning lawyer to recognize the limi-
tations which all attorneys share and devote his or her career to the pur-
suit of learning, Proverbs states, "[a]pply your heart to instruction and
your ears to words of knowledge. s7 8 A humble lawyer who is open to cor-
rection through experience and teaching acquires wisdom79 and, with fear
of the LORD, wealth, honor, and life.80
E. Honesty
Maintaining basic honesty has always been one of the major chal-
lenges for attorneys. David Hoffman warned that the attorney role neces-
sarily "brings its ministers into a too intimate and dangerous
73. Proverbs 14:31.
74. Proverbs 22:22-23
75. Proverbs 29:14.
76. HoFFmAN, supra note 2, at 766.
77. Proverbs 26:12; see also Proverbs 19:2 ("It is not good to have zeal without knowl-
edge, nor to be hasty and miss the way.").
78. Proverbs 23:12; see also Proverbs 15:14 ("The discerning heart seeks knowledge,
but the mouth of a fool feeds on folly.").
79. Proverbs 15:32 ("He who ignores discipline despises himself, but whoever heeds
correction gains understanding.").
80. Proverbs 22:4 ("Humility and the fear of the LoRD bring wealth and honor and
life.").
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acquaintance with man's depravity."' George Sharswood cautioned his
students: "There are pitfalls and mantraps at every step, and the mere
youth, at the very outset of his career, needs often the prudence and self-
denial, as well as the moral courage, which belong commonly to riper
years."8 2
Today, dishonest behavior, principally misappropriation of client
funds, is among the most frequent reasons for attorney discipline.8 3 While
modern law teaching tends to foster moral relativism,8 4 Proverbs con-
demns any form of dishonesty:
Stolen water is sweet; food eaten in secret is delicious! But little do they
know that the dead are there, that her guests are in the depths of the
grave. 
8 5
Food gained by fraud tastes sweet to a man, but he ends up with a
mouth full of gravel.8
No matter what the financial stakes, Proverbs counsels honest behavior
that will preserve the blessing of a good reputation: "[T]o be esteemed is
better than silver or gold."
8
1
7
F. Candor
Modern practice attempts a distinction between candor and honesty
that places undue reliance on the adversary system and is not supported
by Proverbs. ABA Model Rule 3.3 creates a duty of "candor" toward a
tribunal.88 While the rule prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a
81. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 745.
82. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 55.
83. See Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991:
An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 947,
971 (1994) (indicating that from 1982 to 1991, 17.9% of the attorney discipline cases decided
by the Ohio Supreme Court involved theft of client or third-party funds).
84. Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41
J. LEGAL EDUc. 3, 7 (1991). Menkel-Meadow notes that
[T]he traditional classroom fosters adversariness, argumentativeness, and zeal-
otry, along with the view that lawyers are only the means through which clients
accomplish their ends-what is "right" is whatever works for this particular cli-
ent or this particular case. We extol loyalty to the client above all and neglect
the responsibility of the lawyer to counsel the client about moral and other con-
cerns. Our case-by-case method, which focuses on identifying principles of doc-
trine rather than principles of behavior also encourages moral relativism.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. Proverbs 9:17-18.
86. Proverbs 20:17.
87. Proverbs 22:1.
88. ABA Model Rules 3.3(a) & (b) state:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is nec-
essary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling ju-
risdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the posi-
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false statement of material fact, it allows an attorney to withhold material
facts from the tribunal unless disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting
the client in a crime or fraud.8 9 Model Rule 4.1 applies a similar require-
ment of "truthfulness" to statements made by an attorney to oppo-
nents.90 "Candor" or "truthfulness" requires an honest answer to a
specific inquiry, but permits the withholding of unfavorable information
not specifically requested by an opponent. The underlying assumption is
that the adversary system affords the parties an impartial tribunal, whose
responsibility is to determine the truth of the matter.9 1 Under these rules,
the practice of discovery, negotiation, alternative dispute resolution, and
trial has evolved into an exercise in gamesmanship where reputable attor-
neys divulge adverse information only where it is impossible to interpret
an adversary's inquiry in a way which does not require disclosure. 
2 Of
course, in some of these settings a tribunal will effectively have no role in
ascertaining the truth, and any deception, therefore, is likely to remain
unchecked.
This view was not always the standard for practice. David Hoffman
in his resolution on negotiation stated:
tion of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the law-
yer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceed-
ing, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise
protected by rule 1.6 [confidentiality of information].
MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rules 3.3(a), (b).
89. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(2).
90. ABA Model Rule 4.1 provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6 [Confidentiality of
Information].
MODEL RULEs, supra note 15, Rule 4.1.
91. The comments state that "an attorney does not vouch for the evidence submitted
in a cause; the tribunal is responsible for assessing its probative value." MODEL RULES,
supra note 15, Rule 3.3 cmt.
92. As a general rule the courts are unable to effectively police this behavior. On rare
occasions, however, a court will impose significant sanctions for extreme misconduct. One
such case is Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858
P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993). The case began as a malpractice and products liability suit on
behalf of a two-year-old girl who suffered permanent brain damage from a medication. Id. at
1058. The physician defendant cross-claimed against the pharmaceutical company. Id. The
company avoided the production of smoking gun documents and the identification of their
custodian by giving what the court characterized as "evasive or misleading responses" to the
physician's discovery requests regarding the drug's main ingredient and a related product.
Id. at 1080. The trial court refused to issue sanctions. On appeal, the Supreme Court re-
versed and directed the trial court to determine who should be sanctioned and the amount.
Id. at 1084. The trial judge sanctioned the company and its counsel in the amount of
$325,000. Fines Say It's Not OK to Withhold Evidence, SFAMTTr. TuMxs, Jan. 30, 1994, at
B2.
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I will never permit myself to enter upon a system of tactics, to ascertain
who shall overreach the other, by the most nicely balanced artifices of
disingenuousness, by mystery, silence, obscurity, suspicion, vigilance to
the letter, and all of the other machinery used by this class of tacti-
cians, to the vulgar surprise of clients, and the admiration of a few ill
judging lawyers.93
George Sharswood offered similar advice: "[H]e who sits down deliber-
ately to plot a surprise upon his opponent, and which he knows can suc-
ceed only by its being a surprise, deserves to fall, and in all probability
will fall, into the trap which his own hands have laid.14 He finds support
from the saying of the "wise man" in Proverbs 26:27: "Whosoever diggeth
a pit shall fall therein, and he that rolleth a stone, it will return upon
hi.
9 5
Because it is God who provides justice, Proverbs leaves no room for
deception: "Honest scales and balances are from the LORD; all the weights
in the bag are of his making." 98 In this scheme, the balances are meta-
phors both for judgment and the honesty of the participants. 9 The text
affirms that "[t]he LORD detests lying lips, but he delights in men who are
truthful."9 In this context, truthfulness is not just the absence of affirma-
tive misstatement, as in the Model Rules, but any speech which misleads.
Proverbs' command is straightforward: "Do not . . . use your lips to
deceive." ' The standard is not to be diluted by artifice as: "[T]he LORD
condemns a crafty man." 10 0 Thus, recent standards of legal ethics that
describe the lawyer's duty in terms of "candor," rather than "honesty,"
are not supported by Proverbs.
G. Truthful Testimony
An attorney's use of false testimony presents similar issues. While
the Model Rules prohibit an attorney from knowingly using false evi-
dence, 101 lawyers have debated whether a criminal defense attorney who
learns that a client intends to testify on matters that the attorney knows
are untrue may (assuming the client cannot be dissuaded) nonetheless
93. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 764.
94. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 73-74.
95. Id. at 74 (citing Proverbs 26:27 (King James)).
96. Proverbs 16:11.
97. See Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Bal-
ance Between the Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 1027 (1994)
(describing uses of the balance metaphor in law and literature).
98. Proverbs 12:22.
99. Proverbs 24:28.
100. Proverbs 12:2.
101. MODEL RULEs, supra note 15, Rule 3.3(a)(4). For the text of Rule 3.3(a)(4), see
supra note 88. See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168-171 (1986) (citing Rule 3.3, in
dicta, for proposition that criminal defense attorney's threats to withdraw and to reveal
perjury by client were permissible and holds there was no deprivation of Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in these circumstances).
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offer the client's testimony and argue it to the jury.10 2 Proverbs offers a
clear response to this issue in its repeated condemnation of false testi-
mony. Among the things the Lord "hates" and finds "detestable" is "a
false witness who pours out lies." 103 To emphasize this point, Proverbs
asserts that: "[a] corrupt witness mocks at justice." 4 Indeed, the book
compares testimony that falsely accuses another to a deadly weapon:
"Like a club or a sword or a sharp arrow is the man who gives false testi-
mony against his neighbor." 10 5 The attorney who is committed to Prover-
bial practice will not present and argue such a client's testimony, as the
Scripture commands that: "[t]he righteous hate what is false."100 Indeed,
Proverbs effectively requires the attorney either to withdraw from the
representation or to reveal the perjury to the tribunal. "A false witness
will perish, and whoever listens to him will be destroyed forever."1
0 7
H. Civility
Incivility among lawyers in modern practice has reached crisis pro-
portions. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has noted: "The justice system
cannot function effectively when those charged with its function cannot
be polite to one another . . . . If there is one thing on which we should
agree, it is the need to put civility back in our profession." '08As one com-
mentator has suggested, however, even the Supreme Court fails to exem-
plify this quality in its opinions.109 David Hoffman and George Sharswood
recognized the importance of civility to the ethical lawyer. Hoffman re-
solved that "[i]n all intercourse with my professional brethren, I will be
always courteous."'1 0 Similarly, George Sharswood taught:
Indeed it is highly important that the temper of an advocate should
always be equal. He should most carefully aim to repress everything
like excitability and irritability. When passion is allowed to prevail, the
judgment is dethroned. Words are spoken, or things done, which the
parties afterward wish could be left unsaid or undone. Equanimity and
self-possession are qualities of unspeakable value.111
In recent years, lawyers have drifted far from the standards of civil-
ity recognized by Hoffman and Sharswood. Proverbs recognizes the signif-
icance of this problem with over sixty verses relating to concepts such as
the tongue, lips, word, quarrel, dissension, and answer." 2 Among the most
102. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3.3 cmts. 7-10.
103. Proverbs 6:16-19.
104. Proverbs 19:28.
105. Proverbs 25:18.
106. Proverbs 13:5.
107. Proverbs 21:28.
108. James Podgers, Changes Sought in Civil Justice System, A.BA. J., Feb. 1994, at
111, 112.
109. Philip Allen Lacovara, Un-Courtly Manners, A.BJA J., Dec. 1994, at 50, 50.
110. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 752.
111. SHARswooD, supra note 6, at 64.
112. E.g., Proverbs 4:24, 5:2, 6:14, 6:19, 8:6-8, 10:12-13, 10:18-21, 10:31-32, 11:12, 12:14,
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pithy and poetic are:
When words are many, sin is not absent, but he who holds his tongue is
wise.
11 3
Reckless words pierce like a sword, but the tongue of the wise brings
healing."
4
A gentle answer turns away wrath, but a harsh word stirs up anger.,LL
The tongue has the power of life and death, and those who love it will
eat its fruit." 6
A word aptly spoken is like apples of gold in settings of silver."'
Through patience a ruler can be persuaded, and a gentle tongue can
break a bone." 8
As Professor Shaffer has suggested, if the profession is to rise above the
level of Rambo-like combat often seen today, lawyers must take seriously
Proverbs' teachings on the concept of servanthood, which includes recon-
ciliation with one's enemies.1'" Shaffer cites two verses which exemplify
this teaching: "If your enemy is hungry, give him food to eat; if he is
thirsty, give him water to drink; so you will heap coals on his head, and
the LORD will reward you."' 20 The point, of course, is not that the Prover-
bial practitioner will punish opponents by returning good for evil; instead,
the contrasting behavior will convict them in the sense of causing them to
recognize a wrong and to seek change.
CONCLUSION
Proverbs offers lawyers a challenge of character:
Wisdom is supreme; therefore get wisdom. Though it cost all you have,
get understanding.
Esteem her, and she will exalt you; embrace her, and she will honor
you.
She will set a garland of grace on your head and present you with a
crown of splendor. 2'
12:18, 12:25, 13:2-3, 14:3, 14:7, 15:1-2, 15:4, 15:7, 15:18, 15:23, 16:1, 16:13, 16:23, 16:28, 16:30,
17:4, 17:7, 17:14, 17:19-20, 17:28, 18:6-7, 18:20-21, 19:1, 20:3, 20:15, 21:23, 22:17-18, 23:16,
24:1-2, 24:26, 24:28, 25:11, 25:15, 25:23, 26:4-5, 26:17, 26:20, 26:24, 26:28, 28:23, 28:25, 29:22,
and 31:26.
113. Proverbs 10:19.
114. Proverbs 12:18.
115. Proverbs 15:1.
116. Proverbs 18:21.
117. Proverbs 25:11.
118. Proverbs 25:15.
119. Thomas L. Shaffer, Moral Theology in Legal Ethics, 12 CAP. U. L. REv. 179, 180-
81 (1982).
120. Id. at 181 (quoting Proverbs 25:21-22); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and
Sectarian Arguments in Religiously Affiliated American Law Schools, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1859, 1878-79 (1993) (proposing a sectarian law school "theology" faithful to Judeo-Chris-
tian values).
121. Proverbs 4:7-9.
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There is evidence that the legal profession senses a need to address the
question of its character. Modern practitioners are beginning to redis-
cover the importance of values. A recent Perspective published in the
ABA Journal urges that "[1]awyers should be trained more like doctors.
They, too, are caregivers, entrusted with society's moral health. In fact,
lawyers should not be "trained" but educated. Students should learn to
consider not what behavior the law should enforce, but what values it
embodies. '122 Applied to ethics, this position entails a recognition that
the mere inculcation of the detailed prescriptive norms of the modern
codes is insufficient to ensure the integrity of the profession.
Ethical practice is not possible absent foundational moral values.
Proverbs supplied these values for the establishment of our nation's legal
ethics, as taught by David Hoffman and George Sharswood. The wisdom
of Proverbs, reflecting the Judeo-Christian ethic, provides guidance for
the modern practice of law. Proverbs advocates "a belief in public values
and the willingness to act on them.' 123 These values include justice, pu-
rity, mercy, humility, honesty, candor, truthful testimony, and civility. If
practitioners accept Proverbs' challenge to seek wisdom, the profession
may yet experience the regenerative process envisioned by Professor Fiss.
122. Robert C. Cumbow, A Learned Profession, ABA. J., July 1995, at 104, 104.
123. Fiss, supra note 29, at 14.
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